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TESTING COMPETING THEORIES OF
JUSTIFICATION
PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY*

Nearly every jurisdiction's criminal law recognizes justification
defenses, defenses that exculpate a person whose conduct would
otherwise be criminal because the conduct is accepted or
encouraged due to special circumstance. While justification
defenses themselves are nearly universal, there is much
disagreementover whether the defense is given because a person's
act avoids a greaterharm, the so-called deeds theory, or because
she acts for the right reason, the so-called reasons theory. At least
part of this debate focuses upon which theory best reflects
community intuitions. In this Article, Professors Robinson and
Darley report the results of an empirical study measuring
community intuitions regarding justification defenses. They
conclude that the deeds theory of justification better accords with
community views than the reasons theory. The study's results
suggest, and the authors discuss, a reformulation of many aspects
of offense definitions, reforms to justification defenses, mitigations
for mistake as to a justification, and reforms of jury acquittal
verdicts. Such conclusions illustrate the potential usefulness of
social science research for resolving issues disputed among
criminal law theorists, as well as for providing valuable
information to the drafters of criminalcodes. Finally, the authors
argue that reforms arisingfrom such empiricalstudies increase the
law's moral credibility, which in turn increases its long-term
effectiveness in crime control.
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Justification defenses, such as self-defense and law enforcement
authority, are common in every jurisdiction. They share the
characteristic of exculpating a person whose conduct otherwise would
constitute a criminal offense, because the conduct is accepted or
encouraged given the presence of special justifying circumstances.,
For example, a police officer's conduct in making an arrest may
satisfy the requirements of assault, but she is free from liability if that
conduct also satisfies the requirements of the law enforcement
1. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw 401-69 (1997) (discussing
justification defenses in detail).
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justification for the use of force. A lost camper who takes food from
another's cabin may have committed an act that satisfies the elements
of the crime of theft, but he is exculpated under a lesser evils
justification defense if the taking is necessary to prevent his starving
to death.
Justification defenses are distinguishable from excuse defenses
in a fundamental way. Both exculpate, but for different reasons. An
actor pleading justification claims to have acted properly, that she did
the right thing. An actor pleading excuse, such as insanity, duress, or
involuntary conduct, admits that what she did was wrong, but claims
that some characteristic or her condition leaves her blameless for the
offense.
Despite the universal recognition of justification defenses, there
is disagreement over the underlying theory of the justificatory
principle, and thus the proper legal formulation of such defenses. At
the core of the debate about the principle is the following question:
Are justification defenses given because the actor's deed avoids a
greater harm, or because she acted for the right reason?
The deeds theory of justification justifies conduct that avoids a
greater harm, and thus it is conduct that we would be happy to
tolerate under similar circumstances in the future. Justified conduct,
under this theory, occurs when the actor has done the right deed,
hence, the "deeds" theory of justification. The reasons theory looks
not to the deed but to the reason for the deed. The reasons theory,
then, gives a defense when a person acts for the right reason,
generally trying to avoid a greater harm. The issue between the two
theories concerns the focus of justification. Is the focus of
justification the nature of the deed, or the actor's reason for acting?
The debate to date relies in large part upon legal and
philosophical arguments.2 But frequently a third source of authority
is brought into play. Each side buttresses its arguments with claims
that its theory better tracks community intuitions, 3 a common claim
in criminal law arguments. In this Article we test those claims about
community intuitions, using policy-capturing social science research
techniques designed for such inquiries. In the process, we learn
about community views on the proper theory and formulation of
justification defenses, as well as other criminal law doctrines, and
2. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v.
Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 45, 47-49 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds.,
1996) (citing various authorities).
3. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 556-57 (1978); 2
PAuL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 122(e), at 23-27 (1984).

1098

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

about the value of social science research to criminal law
formulation.
I. COMPETING THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION

In many cases, an actor's conduct will be both objectively and
subjectively justified. The actor believes his conduct avoids a greater
harm and he acts to avoid that greater harm, thereby satisfying the
reasons theory, and his conduct does in fact avoid a greater harm,
thereby satisfying the deeds theory. But in many other cases, the
deeds and reasons theories clash and give different results, and it is
these cases of conflict that are the focus of this study.
Where the reasons theory of justification (sometimes called the
"subjective" theory) is adopted, the standard justification
formulation provides that "an actor is justified if he believes that the
conduct is necessary"4 to defend against unlawful aggression, to make
an arrest, to maintain order on the vehicle, and so on.5 Under this
reasons theory, a person will get a justification defense as long as she
believes that the justifying circumstances exist. Whether they
actually exist or not is irrelevant.
Under a deeds theory (sometimes termed an "objective"
theory), the rationale for justification is whether or not the conduct is
something that we are content to have the actor perform due to the
justifying circumstances and to have others perform under similar
circumstances in the future. The test for justification is whether, on
balance, the conduct in fact avoids a net societal harm (in the
broadest sense). An actor's reasons may be relevant to liability
under other criminal law doctrines: A mistaken reasonable belief
that the conduct is justified may exculpate under an excuse defense; a
mistaken belief that the conduct is not justified may inculpate as an
impossible attempt offense. But an actor's reasons are not relevant
under the deeds theory in determining whether a justification defense
is available.
This, then, is the point of dispute in the theory of justification: Is
the objectively justified nature of the deed central, as the deeds
theory would have it, or irrelevant, as the reasons theory suggests?
Most commentators have signed on in support of the reasons
theory and in opposition to the deeds theory,6 some suggesting that
4. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.01 (1985) (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., id. §§ 3.01-3.11 (setting forth justification formulations).
6. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTt, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW 685 (1986) (claiming that in order to have the benefit of justification one

1998]

THEORIES OFJUSTIFICATION

1099

the latter is "absurd," 7 unfair,' or unduly burdensome.9 (It is worth
noting that the first two of these objections are based on the moral
intuitions of the writers, coupled with their certainty that others share
their moral intuitions.) Taking the minority side, one of us has
argued that a deeds theory of justification is better for a variety of
reasons, including that it generates liability results that are more just
and that better match our collective intuitions of what is just."0
Most, but not all, states appear to follow the reasons theory in
their criminal law," although there is often some ambiguity as to
which theory of justification they actually adopt, despite the apparent
clarity of first appearances.' 2 The Model Penal Code formulation is
quoted above: An actor is justified if she believes that her conduct is
necessary for defense. 3
Current English law also appears to adopt the reasons theory.
Professors Smith and Hogan, for example, conclude that the law "is

must act for that particular purpose); J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 37
(8th ed. 1996) (requiring state of mind as well as state of fact for justification to be
reasonable); Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 489 (1991) (arguing that state of mind is a necessary component
of justification and that Robinson's proposed extemalist perspective is impossible to
accept); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (1984) (recognizing that most modem statutes require a
subjective belief in justification and that Robinson's fully objective approach is an
exception).
7. See Brian Hogan, The DadsonPrinciple,1989 CRIM. L. REv. 679, 680 ("It seems
to me absurd to say that I may justify or excuse my conduct, however callous it was in the
circumstances known to me at the time, by showing that there existed other circumstances
which, had I but known of them, would have justified or excused my conduct.").
8. See Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the
Factors on Which Our Criminal Law Is Predicated,66 N.C. L. REV. 283, 289 (1988)
(arguing that, as a matter of fairness, the issue ought to be one solely of culpability rather
than result).
9. See Kevin McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 978 (1989) ("[A purely objective view of self-defense] is a more
difficult factual question for the defendant to resolve than the question of her own
subjective belief since calculation of the harm threatened involves a number of variables
[that] are beyond the defendant's ability to perceive .....
10. See Robinson, supra note 2.
11. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 184(b), at 399-403 (listing state criminal code
justification sections that include a requirement that the actor "believe" his or her
conduct is justified).
12. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 51-54 (noting that the Model Penal Code
ultimately recognizes the importance of the distinction between a "belief' in a
justification and actual, objective justification, when it creates the concepts of
"privileged" and unprivileged justification).
13. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.02(1), 3.03(3)(a), 3.04(1), 3.05(1)(b), 3.06(1),
3.07(1) (1985) (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying note 4 (quoting the
Model Penal Code formulation).
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stated exclusively in terms of the defendant's belief,"114 citing the

cases of Gladstone Williams, Dadson, and Thain. 5 Section 24 of
England's Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 appears to be an

exception to the general rule, for it justifies an arrest even if the
officer did not at the time know of or believe in the justifying
circumstances,' 6 reflecting a deeds theory of justification. Clauses 44
and 185 of the proposed Criminal Code for England and Wales
apparently would broaden this exception to make it the general
rule. That is, they adopt a deeds theory as their general approach.
They provide a justification defense if the actor "uses such force as,
in the circumstances which exist," is immediately necessary and
reasonable for defense. 8 Interestingly, the drafters claim that the
provision codifies the common law of self-defense and defense of
another. 9 They concede that it modifies the common law of defense
of property but argue that this modification is necessary to avoid an

irrational inconsistency between the rules for the different defensive
force defenses. 20
The contrasts between the two theories are illuminated when we
consider how the deeds theory and the reasons theory suggest
different results at each of the two conflict points: (1) when the actor
mistakenly believes her conduct is not justified (the unknowingly
justified actor); and (2) when the actor mistakenly believes her
14. SMITH & HOGAN, supranote 6, at 265.
15. Gladstone Williams, 78 Crim. App. 276 (1983); Regina v. Dadson, 4 Cox C.C. 358
(Crim. App. 1850); Regina v. Thain, 1985 N. Ir. 457 (C.A.).
16. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 24, § 4(a) (Eng.) (providing that an
actor may arrest without a warrant "anyone who is in the act of committing an arrestable
offence"); id. § 5(a) (providing that an actor may arrest without a warrant "anyone who is
guilty of the offence"); id. § 7(a) (providing that an actor may arrest without a warrant
"anyone who is about to commit an arrestable offence").
17. See 1 A CRIMINAL CODE FOR ENGLAND AND WALES cls. 44, 185 (Law
Commission, Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill 1989).
18. 1 id. (emphasis added). These same proposed code provisions also allow a
defense if the actor uses such force as, "in the circumstances ... which he believes to
exist," is immediately necessary and reasonable for defense. 1 id. (emphasis added) The
use of this "believes" language does not make the provision one based upon a reasons
theory of justification, for it still allows a justification without requiring proof of a belief in
the justifying circumstances. The effect of such language is to allow a defense either upon
actual or believed justifying circumstances. Nothing in the deeds theory prohibits a
defense for mistake as to a justification. On the contrary, it assumes that such a defense
will be provided but will be understood to be an excuse. Note that the provision of the
proposed code does not identify either defense as a justification or an excuse.
19. The drafters explain: "[I]f his defence is that he was defending his person, or that
of another, the test at common law is whether what he did was reasonable." 2 id. 12.25,
at 231 (emphasis added).
20. See 2 id.
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conduct is justified (mistake as to a justification).
A.

The Unknowingly JustifiedActor

Assume a person's conduct is objectively justified but he does
not realize this; he mistakenly believes it is unjustified. For example,
the person mugs a jogger, only to find out that the victim was a clubwielding attacker. Whether the beating of the attacker-thought-tobe-a-jogger is justified depends on whether it is the quality of the
deed or the actor's reasons for it that provide the rationale for
justification defenses.
Under the deeds theory, when the person's conduct in fact
avoids a greater societal harm but the person is unaware of this, the
conduct is justified despite the actor's ignorance. However, the
person's belief that the conduct is not justified will give rise to
attempt liability (assuming the jurisdiction punishes legally
impossible attempts, as most do"1). Thus, the use of force against the
attacker-thought-to-be-a-jogger is justified and the actor will have a
defense to the substantive offense for assault, but the actor will be
liable for an attempted assault. Attempt is an offense that exists to
punish just such manifested intention to commit an offense, when the
harm or evil of the offense does not in fact occur, and presents a
situation analogous to that of the unknowingly justified actor, who
has manifested an intention to act unjustifiably, but in fact no net
societal harm has occurred.
Under the reasons theory, if the justifying circumstances exist
but the actor is unaware of them and acts for a different purpose, a
justification defense is denied. If what matters is the reason for the
deed, not the deed itself, the force used against the attacker-thoughtto-be-a-jogger is not justified. While it might have been the right
deed, necessary for self-defense, it was for the wrong reason.
B.

Mistake as to a Justification

More common is the reverse case: A person's conduct is
objectively unjustified but the person subjectively, mistakenly
believes that it is justified. In such cases of mistaken justification, the
actor believes that her conduct avoids a greater harm, when in fact it
does not. The club-wielding attacker, when successfully overcome
and dragged to the street light, turns out to be a jogger carrying a
flashlight whose bulb is out. Whether beating the jogger-mistaken21. See 1 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 85(c), at 428 n.28 (listing and updating
authorities).
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for-an-attacker is justified depends again on whether the justification
defense is given (1) because the conduct in fact is justified, or (2)
because the person acts for a justified reason.
Under a reasons theory, the force used against the joggermistaken-for-an-attacker is justified because it is used for the purpose
of self-defense. The actor's reason is right even if the conduct is
wrong. Under the deeds theory, a person who mistakenly believes
that the conduct is justified is not justified, although the person may
gain an excuse defense if the mistake is reasonable or perhaps a
mitigation even if it is not.22
Note that in this case the end result under the two theories
seems to be the same. The difference is primarily a labeling matter:
The person who reasonably but mistakenly believes that her conduct
is justified is "justified" under the reasons theory but only "excused"
under the deeds theory.
This difference may have practical
implications for third parties. For example, a jurisdiction might
criminalize resistance to justified force, like a lawful arrest, yet allow
3
resistance to excused force, like that of the psychotic aggressor.
This common approach creates problems for use of the reasons
theory. Presumably we want the victim to be able lawfully to resist
the actor who is mistaken as to a justification. The jogger mistaken
for a mugger ought to be able lawfully to resist the misguided attack.
But, if the attacker mistakenly believes she is justified and, as the
reasons theory would have it, that makes her "justified," then the
criminal code must do some fancy dancing to reach the proper result.
It must create a special rule that allows defenders to defend against
these special kinds of justified attacks but not other kinds of justified
attacks.
But, putting aside this third-party complication for the reasons
theory, the result of the two theories is the same for the actor at
hand. Both the deeds theory's excuse defense and the reasons
theory's justification defense exculpate the actor who mistakenly
believes she is justified. Yet, the different views of justification may
show themselves in another aspect of defense formulations that has
been the subject of much disagreement: the proper treatment of
mistake as to a justification. All agree that a reasonable mistake as
to a justification ought to exculpate fully. What is the proper
22. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (1985) (providing reduced liability for
unreasonable mistakes as to a justification).
23. See, e.g., id. § 3.11(1) (defining "unlawful force," which triggers a right of justified
defensive force, as including the attack of the psychotic aggressor but excluding privileged
(objectively justified) force, such as that used to make a lawful arrest).
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treatment of an unreasonable mistake as to a justification?
A majority of jurisdictions permit a mistake-as-to-a-justification
defense only if the actor's mistake is reasonable. An unreasonable
mistake, reckless or negligent, gives no defense and hence generates
full liability for the substantive offense.24 A minority of jurisdictions
give a complete defense for reasonable mistake but also allow a
mitigation for an honest but unreasonable mistake.' The level of
liability, that is, the extent of the mitigation given, typically is tied to
the level of culpability of the mistake: A negligent mistake, being
mistake, gives a greater mitigation than
less culpable than a reckless
26
does a reckless mistake.
The few jurisdictions that take the deeds approach in
formulating their justification defenses objectively (for example,
North Dakota and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code) all give
mitigations for unreasonable mistakes as to a justification.27 In
contrast, a majority of the jurisdictions that take a reasons approach
and formulate their justification defenses subjectively take the all-ornothing approach, giving no mitigation or defense for unreasonable
mistakes as to a justification.' This pattern suggests a connection
between the deeds-reasons dispute and the dispute over the proper
treatment of unreasonable mistakes as to a justification. But the fact
is there is no logical reason why the reasons theory should demand an
all-or-nothing approach.
One could speculate about the, source of the apparent
correlation between the reasons theory and the all-or-nothing
approach. If one views mistaken justification as a justification, it
would be easy to conclude that an all-or-nothing approach is needed.
After all, all-or-nothing is the way objective justification does
operate. Either the actor's conduct avoids a greater harm and is to
be encouraged or at least tolerated in the future, or it does not avoid
a greater harm and is to be discouraged in the future. When the
subjective reasons theory of justification combines objective
justification and mistaken subjective justification under the same
24. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 184(a), at 395 n.1 (listing and updating
authorities).
25. See 2 id.
26. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2).
27. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-05-01 to -09 (1985); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE

ch.6 (1971). For a list of jurisdictions that have at least one objective justification statute,
see 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 122(e), at 22 n.19.
28. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 184(a), at 395 n.1 (listing and updating
authorities).
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label, "justified," it should be no surprise that such labeling creates
the tendency to treat a mistaken justification as if it were a true
objective justification. It should be no surprise to see mistake as to a
justification treated, like all other justifications, as an all-or-nothing
issue.
This same possibility for confusion does not exist under the
deeds approach to formulating justifications. The deeds theory
distinguishes true objective justifications from mistakes as to a
justification, and it treats the latter as excuses.
Objective
justifications are properly all-or-nothing matters. Mistakes as to a
justification, like other excuses, just as clearly are not all-or-nothing
matters. Excuses function as part of law's adjudication of an actor's
blameworthiness for a violation. Blameworthiness exists on a
continuum, as is evident by the doctrines that contribute to this
function.
Among the different functions of the criminal law, objective
justifications serve the ex ante rule articulation function, telling
people the rules for future conduct. Conversely, excuses, including
mistaken justification, perform an ex post adjudication function,
assessing the degree of liability and punishment for a violation of the
rules of conduct. 9
In performing the adjudication function, doctrines commonly
express degrees of liability and punishment. For example, criminal
codes typically recognize levels of culpability: purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence. The law also recognizes mitigations for
partial excuses in both its definition of offenses (such as the extreme
mental or emotional disturbance mitigation in homicide 0 ) and its
sentencing rules (such as the federal sentencing guideline
authorization for sentence reduction below the guidelines for
offenders influenced by coercion, duress, or diminished capacity31 ).
Under the deeds theory, mistakes as to a justification are seen as
excuses, and like other doctrines for the adjudication of an actor's
blameworthiness, the resulting liability may reflect a continuum of
liability. Reasonable mistakes may excuse entirely, while the
culpability inherent in unreasonable mistakes may suggest something
less-a mitigation rather than a defense.

29. See Paul H. Robinson, A FunctionalAnalysisof CriminalLaw, 88 NW. U. L. REv.
857, 889-96 (1994); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principlesof Adjudication, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 729,729-71 (1990).
30. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b).
31. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K2.12,5K2.13 (1997).
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The Importance of Community Views in the Formulationof
CriminalLaw

Before we launch into an exposition of the process of
determining community moral intuitions in the reasons versus deeds
controversy, we ought to say just why we think community views are
relevant to the debate. First, those debating the issue have conceded
the relevance of community views, when they make statements
pointing out that the deeds theory of justification is "absurd." '3 What
this conclusion turns out to mean is that the author of that statement
feels that the deeds theory violates his moral intuitions, and it implies
that his moral intuitions are those that all community members would
also hold. This is an empirical proposition; it may turn out that the
community holds views that resemble a deeds theory of justification
rather than a reasons theory or, as that writer asserts, vice versa. In
any event, those writers appealing to moral intuitions to support their
theory have conceded, at a minimum, that the community intuitions
deserve a place in the debate. 3 Thus one task is to determine
community moral intuitions, the degree to which these intuitions
support any of the relevant justificatory theories, and the consensus
with which community members hold their views.
A second reason for seeking to discover community views is that
it is at least necessary to know when legal codes, for whatever reason,
conflict with or override the moral intuitions of the governed
community. For when they do, it is useful for the code drafters to
educate the community as to why the code formulation is preferable,
either morally or otherwise. Without this education, conflicts that
the community discovers between legal codes and moral intuitions
are likely to engender socially destructive sentiments and actions on
the part of the governed. (Think of the consequences of prohibition
in the United States.)
Of course, it is possible that citizens are unaware of the conflict
between codes and their moral intuitions-which brings us to the
third reason to discover community intuitions in various areas
governed by codes. Absent knowledge of the true provisions of the
code, citizens are likely to believe that the code conforms with their
own moral intuitions.3 5 If the community moral intuitions are in fact
32. See Hogan, supra note 7, at 680.
33. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
34. See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV.453,487 (1997).
35. In a recent study, New Jersey citizens reported that attempt was criminalized by
the state code in ways that were tightly coupled with their own moral intuitions, but very
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quite deviant from the actual content of the code, the code is failing
its ex ante function, failing to provide known clear guidelines that
people can use to govern their conduct.
Finally, we have argued elsewhere that the criminal code ought
to be in general agreement with the moral principles of those the
code governs. 6 Here is a brief summary of the argument: The real
power to enforce compliance with society's rules of prescribed
conduct lies not in the threat or reality of official criminal sanction,
but in the power of the intertwined forces of social and individual
moral control. The networks of interpersonal relationships in which
people find themselves, the social norms and prohibitions shared
among those relationships and transmitted through those social
networks, and the internalized representations of those norms and
moral precepts cause people to obey the law.37
The law is not irrelevant to these social and personal forces.
Criminal law, in particular, plays a central role in creating and
maintaining the social consensus necessary for sustaining moral
norms. In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may
be the only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and
ethnic differences. Thus, the criminal law's most important real
world effect is arguably its ability to assist in the building, shaping,
and maintaining of these norms and moral principles. It contributes
to and harnesses the compliance-producing power of interpersonal
relationships and personal morality. 8
The criminal law can have a second effect in gaining compliance
with its commands. If it earns a reputation as a reliable statement of
what the community, given sufficient information and time to reflect,
perceives as condemnable, people are more likely to defer to its
commands as morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in
those borderline cases in which the propriety of certain conduct is
unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the actor. The importance of
this role should not be underestimated; in a society with the complex
interdependencies characteristic of ours, an apparently harmless
action can have destructive consequences. When the action is
criminalized by the legal system, one wants the citizen to respect the
law in such an instance even though he or she does not immediately
poorly coupled to the actual code provisions.

See John Darley et al., Community

Standards for Defining Attempt: Inconsistencies with the Model Penal Code, 39 AM.
BEHAV. ScI. 405,414 (1996).

36. See Robinson & Darley, supranote 34.
37. See id. at 468-71.
38. See id. at 471-74.
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intuit why that action is banned. Such deference is facilitated if
citizens are disposed to believe that the law is an accurate guide to
appropriate prudential and moral behavior. 9
The extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in both these
respects-in facilitating and communicating societal consensus on
what is and is not condemnable, and in gaining compliance in
borderline cases through deference to its moral authority-is to a
great extent dependent on the degree of moral credibility that the
criminal law has achieved in the minds of the citizens it governs.
Thus, the criminal law's moral credibility is essential to effective
crime control and is enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability
is perceived as "doing justice," that is, if it assigns liability and
punishment in ways that the community perceives as consistent with
the community's principles of appropriate liability and punishment.
Conversely, the system's moral credibility, and therefore its crimecontrol effectiveness, is undermined by a distribution of liability that
deviates from community perceptions of just desert.
The central point is this: The criminal law's power in nurturing
and communicating societal norms and its power to have people
defer to it in unanalyzed cases are directly proportional to criminal
If criminalization or conviction (or
law's moral credibility.
decriminalization or refusal to convict) is to have an effect in the
norm-nurturing process, it will be because the criminal law has a
reputation for criminalizing and punishing only that which deserves
moral condemnation, and for decriminalizing and not punishing that
which does not. If, instead, the criminal law's reputation is one
simply of a collection of rules, which do not necessarily reflect the
community's perceptions of moral blameworthiness, then there is
little reason to expect the criminal law to be relevant to the societal
debate over what is and is not condemnable and little reason to defer
to it as a moral authority.
We now need to turn to the task of discovering how the
community thinks about the cases that discriminate a reasons theory
of justification from a deeds theory, whether there are describable
principles that match the community's judgments, and whether there
is some degree of consensus among the judging community.

39. See id. at 474-76.
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II. TOOLS FOR TESTING CRIMINAL LAW THEORIES: SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY SCENARIO RESEARCH

A.

Scenariosand Measures
The method we chose to probe subjects' moral intuitions in this

study was the scenario or vignette method. Subjects are presented
with a short description of a person's conduct and are asked whether
the actor should receive liability for the conduct and, if so, how much.
Subjects next are given another scenario, and assess liability and
punishment for that actor, then another scenario, and so on. The
scenarios are varied by the researchers in ways suggested by the
theories being tested, and the patterning of liabilities assigned each
scenario provide differential support for the competing theories.
Rather than having the subjects work their way through what
can quite quickly become a large number of differing scenarios, why
not just ask the subjects whether they think a reason-centered or a

deed-centered theory of justifications is appropriate?

Because

psychologists have discovered that subjects often do not have mental
access to the principles they use to make decisions and thus they
cannot accurately articulate those principles." Instead they are often
driven to report principles that seem plausible to them at the time but
demonstrably do not match their actual decisions. 41 Therefore
researchers carry out what is called a policy-capturing study, in which

40. See Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression
Approaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAv. & HUM. PERF. 649 (1971). In this article, the authors describe an early
demonstration of this proposition that is relevant to the present study. They reviewed
studies in which the subject's task was first to make judgments and second to articulate
how they came to the judgments they made. See id. at 683-84. An example of such a
judgment would be what weights a stockbroker assigned to various items of information
in forming his judgment about the desirability of a particular company's stock. In the
studies they reviewed "all found serious discrepancies between the subjective and
[objective] relative weights." Id. at 684. That is, the judgment-makers were inaccurate in
reporting the weights they in fact placed on the various dimensions when they made their
actual judgments. See id.
More general evidence for this proposition is reviewed in Richard E. Nisbett &
Timothy Decamp Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental
Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 231, 231-59 (1977). The authors' study shows that
individuals sometimes fail to acknowledge the influence of aspects of the stimulus that
actually make a difference in their judgments, see id. at 243-45, and other times report as
influential the effect of aspects that in fact do not enter their judgment processes at all,
see id. at 245-46.
41. See Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 40, at 247-59 (suggesting that people report
what their own implicit theories of decision-making mark as important, rather than what
is actually important to them in practice).
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subjects judge actual cases. The researchers then infer the subjects'
judging principles from the resulting patterning of responses to
different cases. 42
This is what we did in the present research. We presented
subjects with short scenario descriptions of potentially criminal
actions. Because the focus of our research was on contrasting the
reasons theory with the deeds theory of justification defenses, we
designed the variations in our scenarios to reflect those different
theories. Generally, two cases differed in a way that would "make a
difference" to, for instance, a person who held a reasons-centered
view but not to a person with a deeds-centered view. "Make a
difference" here means that the two cases would generate different
liability judgments if the subject took one view of the theory of
justification, but not if she took the other view.
In other words, we conducted an experiment. Experimentation
is an unusual tactic in research concerning legal issues; other
empirical techniques such as opinion surveys, or the examination of
existing records, or other archival procedures are more common.
Part of what we seek to demonstrate to criminal law theorists and
code drafters is that experimentation, used to capture individuals'
patterns of liability assignment, can provide useful information on
their issues of debate.
Subjects first read a paragraph of core information that gave the
background to the various scenarios:
Jake is a farmer who has already harvested his corn crop.
His neighbor has not done so, so his three acres of corn are
still in the fields. The corn crop makes the difference, for
these farmers, between having a profitable season because
they have winter feed for their animals, or going into debt.
Running around several sides of Jake and his neighbor's
fields are dirt roads. Jake's farm and his neighbor's farm
are on a neck of land that stretches out into a lake. Out on
the end of the neck of land is the local town. Jake's
neighbor's fields cut the town off from the mainland, but
Jake's fields do not. The following map shows you this
layout.
42. See Robert S. Billings & Stephen A. Marcus, Measures of Compensatory and
Noncompensatory Models of Decision Behavior: Process Tracing Versus Policy
Capturing,31 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERF. 331, 331 (1983) (commenting
that "one of the oldest and most widely used techniques (for making inferences about the
decision process) is that of policy capturing, wherein the model guiding the decision
process is inferred from the relationship between the cues provided and the judgment of
the subject").
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At this point, the subjects were given the map below in Figure 1,
which makes clear the essential point: The neighbor's fields, but not
Jake's fields, if burned, would create a successful firebreak for the
town.
FIGURE 1
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Next the subjects read a specific scenario
assigned a liability
to the perpetrator described in it For instance,and
one offense scenario
read as follows:

Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that
his neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three
acres of corn. Because the field is bounded on all sides by
dirt roads, and there is no wind, it is clear that the burning
will create no danger beyond that of destroying the corn.
The fire destroys the entire crop.
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This scenario is obviously a case of an offense of moderate
seriousness, and we use it to establish the sentence that subjects
would give to this particular offense. It provides a point of
comparison for later cases, a "control" or "contrast" case, to see
whether subjects think the subsequent cases, in which justifications
for the burning are given, deserve less liability and punishment than
the prototype of the unjustified offense.
Some people may assign consistently higher liabilities than
others. These differences are not the focus of our concerns. In the
experimental design we chose, in which subjects responded to several
scenarios, it is not relevant whether each subject was a generally
harsh or easy sentencer. Our interest is in the patterning of the
difference in liability between specific scenarios, not the absolute
amount of liability in any scenario.
As noted above, scenarios differ in ways designed to elicit one
pattern of liability assignments if the subject uses a reasons theory of
justification, and another if the subject uses a deeds-theory. For
instance, another scenario read as follows:
Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that
his neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three
acres of corn. Because the field is bounded on all sides by
dirt roads, it is clear that the burning will create no danger
beyond that of destroying the neighbor's corn. The fire
destroys the entire crop. Unbeknown to Jake, lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and
the local town and the fire is burning toward the town and
endangering the people who live there. His burning the
field creates a firebreak: The town and its inhabitants are
saved.
From a reasons perspective, the perpetrator is equally liable in
both cases-he intended a harmful act. The fact that the act had a
second, helpful, unintended, consequence is irrelevant. But it is not
irrelevant to a person holding a deeds-based theory. Therefore an
individual assigning a significantly lower liability to this second case
is revealing that she holds a deeds-based theory of justification, while
an individual who assigns this case the same liability as the previous
one is revealing a reason-based theory.
Notice that we have attempted, and we hope succeeded, in
making the two scenarios differ in only one way, the way that is
relevant to the theoretical comparison in question. The subjects
should have perceived the different scenarios as having the same
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overall characteristics, so that any differences in liabilities assigned
can be attributed to the one characteristic that is varied between the
contrasting scenarios.
The task of each subject, then, in response to each scenario was
to assign a degree of liability to the protagonist in the scenario-in
their view, to assign punishment to a wrongdoer. Subjects did this by
marking their judgment on the scale shown below, a scale with which
they quickly became familiar:
LIABILITY SCALE

N

0

1

noliab. liab.
1day
but no
punish.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2wks

2mo

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15yr

30yr

life
death
imprison.
ment

11

As can be seen, the scale gave subjects a choice of assigning to
the protagonist no criminal liability, liability but no punishment, or
eleven levels of punishment, prison sentences ranging from one day
in jail to the death penalty. Notice that the difference between two
adjacent prison sentences becomes greater as one moves to the right
end of the scale. For instance, an assignment of punishment level 2 is
an assignment of two weeks in prison, an increase of only thirteen
days over punishment level 1. An assignment of punishment level 9
is a fifteen-year increase from the punishment represented by level 8.
We constructed the scale in this way for two reasons. First, and
primarily, the differences correspond to the differences in grading
categories used in typical American criminal codes. 43
This
correspondence is quite important because it means that we can
translate a difference between two liability units into a difference of
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West Supp. 1998) (defining five grades of
felonies and two grades of misdemeanors, carrying statutory maximum punishment terms
of the death penalty and life imprisonment, 30, 15, 5, and 1 year, and 60 days
imprisonment); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1, 5/5-8-3 (West 1993) (defining seven grades
of felonies and three grades of misdemeanors, carrying the maximum terms of death
penalty and life imprisonment, 30, 20, 15, 7, 5, 3, and 1 year, 6 months, and 30 days
imprisonment); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 70.00, 70.15 (McKinney 1998) (defining five
grades of felonies and two grades of misdemeanors, carrying the maximum terms of the
death penalty and life imprisonment, 25,15,7,4, and 1 year, and 3 months imprisonment);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-9, 18.2-10, 18.2-12 (Michie 1996) (defining six grades of felonies
and four grades of misdemeanors, carrying the maximum terms of the death penalty and
life imprisonment, 20, 10, 5, and 1 year, and 6 months imprisonment).
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one offense grade in a criminal code.44 Second, this scheme is useful
because the differences correspond, roughly at least, to what ordinary
people perceive as equal differences between sentences. Thus these
sorts of differences are the ones available to code drafters when they
decide how to grade an offense, the ones juries and judges must deal
with when sentencing a convicted offender, and perhaps the ones that
come to the minds of citizens when they read and think about
criminal sentences. a
In designing the scenarios, our task was to create as many as
were needed to provide a reasonably complete test of the
implications of the reason- and deed-based theories and their
differences. We found that eleven scenarios were needed. The full
text of these scenarios is presented in the Appendix to this Article.
What is revealed by contrasts between various scenarios we will
describe in detail in Part IV.
Pilot testing indicated that the eleven scenarios could be read
and evaluated by a subject in approximately half an hour. Further,
the subjects were able to maintain concentration; their reports
indicated that they found the task quite interesting and were
intrigued by thinking about what differences in the cases "made a
difference" to them. Each of our subjects responded to all of the
cases. In the experimental design literature, a study having these
characteristics is referred to as a "within-subjects design." This
design focuses the subjects' attention on the differences between the
scenarios. The danger is that they think that the existence of a
difference implies an instruction from the researcher that the
difference should "make a difference," that is, that it should provoke
different liability assignments from the subject. 46 To counter this
possibility, we told subjects that we did not expect that different
scenarios necessarily should get different liability judgments and that
they were to give us their own judgments about what differences
mattered. Looking over the individual response protocols from this
experiment and other similar ones we have conducted, we note that
44. The utility of this correspondence will become clear in later discussions of the
interpretations of the results. See infra text accompanying notes 57-70.
45. The scale used here is the same as the one developed and first used in PAUL H.
ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTIcE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNrrY VIEWS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995), in which we report the results of a number of studies

that map the community's perceptions of the appropriate liabilities to assign in various
criminal situations. For a more lengthy discussion of the scale and its properties, see id. at
223-25.
46. For a fuller discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of within-subjects designs
in this sort of research, see id. at 221-22.
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subjects did rate some cases alike as to the liabilities they generated.
As is usual in these designs, the order in which the cases were
given to the subjects was randomized. To make the subjects'
contrasting task simpler for them, cases with one dimension of
variation were grouped together. The order of cases within these
groups, as well as the order in which the groups were presented, was
randomized in order to prevent results from being undetectably
dependent upon the order in which the scenarios were judged.
B.

The Sample of Subjects
Any research study must select subjects from the population
about which the research generalizations are intended to apply. Our
concern is with the moral intuitions of the community of citizens
governed by the laws in question. Given that this research is about
differences in the rationale for criminal sentencing that exist at the
national level, eventually one would want to construct a national
sample of subjects. For this initial study of the issue, practical
considerations limited our selection of one set of subjects to the lists
of jury-eligible citizens in a town in New Jersey.4 7 The second set
consisted of college students who were readily available for research.
It is sometimes suggested that students are atypical, in that their
responses would differ from so-called ordinary people. Since we had
both students and ordinary people in our research, we were able to
test this contention.
We tested twenty-seven students (average age 19.2) and twentyone jury-eligible community members (average age 50.8); men and
women were equally represented in both samples, as were the major
religious affiliations of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. Two of each
sample were African-Americans, for a total of four in a panel of
forty-eight. Most subjects in both samples identified themselves as
politically moderate, with the students leaning a little more to the
liberal side of the continuum. Students filled out the questionnaires
in a room on campus; for the community members, questionnaires
were mailed out to them, and occasionally after a telephoned
reminder, the questionnaires were mailed back to us. As expected,
conservatives assigned slightly higher liabilities to the various
scenarios we presented. Our jury-eligible community members also
assigned slightly higher liabilities, over and above the fact that
47. Of those contacted, 56% agreed to participate. This rather high rate of
participation was probably the result of the subjects' agreement with our explanation of
the goals of the research.
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conservatives did so. What is important, for our purposes, is that the
two groups of subjects did not show any significant difference in their
pattern of relative liability assigned among the scenarios.
III. LIABILITY PREDICTIONS

In justification defenses, we are in the minority of
commentators.48 We believe the community's views are more
accurately reflected in doctrine based upon a deeds theory of
justification. It matters to lay persons whether a net societal harm
actually occurs or not, we think, just as it matters to them whether a
prohibited result, such as a resulting death, occurs or not. In
particular, we think the community sees the unknowingly justified
actor as deserving the reduced liability of attempt rather than the full
liability that would come from denying a justification defense. 49 As
to the reverse case of mistake as to a justification, we think the
community views unreasonable mistakes as to a justification as
deserving mitigation, in contrast to the majority rule in the United
States. ° We describe below exactly how these general claims
translate into specific predictions with regard to the liability results of
the scenarios used in the study.
The first six scenarios are contrast cases, the responses to which
established benchmarks for each test subject. These scenarios
provide the full range of possible liability, as well as a variety of
intermediate points. Not only do they give us results of considerable
intrinsic interest in their own right, but more importantly for the
present purposes, they allow us to interpret the liability results of the
last five scenarios, the test scenarios. For each test scenario, we used
as a point of comparison the contrast scenario most relevant with
respect to the competing theories, from a case of an intentional
unjustified act to a completely justified act, or any one of the many
possibilities between those two extremes on the continuum of
liability. Taken together, the following six contrast cases represent
all of the obvious variations of a non-justification case to which the
subjects' responses might be compared.

48. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
49. See supra text accompanying note 21 (discussing attempt liability).
50. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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The ContrastCases
Scenario 1. Intentional (Unjustified) Burning

Scenario 1 presents the prototype case of a burning that is
intentional and for which no claim of justification exists:
Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that
his neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three
acres of corn. Because the field is bounded on all sides by
dirt roads, and there is no wind, it is clear that the burning
will create no danger beyond that of destroying the corn.
The fire destroys the entire crop.
We expect the liability here to be somewhere mid-scale because
the offense is against only property. Our past work suggests that it is
not likely to inspire the heavy penalties at the higher end of the
scale."' Its purpose is to give us a liability rating against which we can
compare the liabilities assigned to other scenarios.
Scenario 2. Attempted (Unjustified) Burning
Scenario 2 is similar to scenario I except that the harm intended
does not actually come about:
Just as Jake sets the fire, the neighbor unexpectedly returns
and puts it out before it does any harm.
A crime like this one typically is treated as an attempt, as
compared to that in scenario 1, which is referred to as the substantive
offense. From our past work, we expect the liability here to be
substantially less than that imposed in scenario 1, even though the
actor's conduct and intention are identical in the two cases. 52 The
fact is, the vast majority of lay persons share a strong intuition that
whether or not the planned harm does or does not occur makes a
difference and that the occurrence of harm increases the punishment
deserved. No claim of justification is at issue in scenario 2.
Scenario 3. Created Risk of (Unjustified) Burning, RealizedReckless Commission
Scenario 3 differs from scenario 2 in that the actor only risks the
burning, rather than intending it. But as in scenario 1, here the harm
actually comes about:

51. See, e.g., ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 45, at studies 6, 8, 11,18.
52. See id. at studies 1, 17.
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Like all of the local farmers, Jake routinely piles dry
cornhusks near where they are cut and eventually burns
them. Jake has one such pile near his neighbor's fields.
Jake wants to get the pile burned quickly; the previous year
he waited and the pile got soaked by rain. He is aware that
high winds are forecast for today; winds that create a real
risk that his fire will jump the gap between his trash pile and
his neighbor's corn fields. Despite this danger, Jake burns
his trash pile, hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's
crop. The winds come and the fire jumps to his neighbor's
crop. The fire destroys the entire crop.
We expect the liability here, as in scenario 2, to be less than that
in scenario 1. Such an offense typically is termed a "crime of
recklessness."
Scenario 4. Created Risk of (Unjustified) Burning, UnrealizedEndangerment
Scenario 4 is similar to scenario 3, but here, luckily, the harm
does not come about:
Despite [the danger from the high winds], Jake burns his
trash pile, hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's
crop. The winds come but, Jake is lucky, the fire does not
jump to his neighbor's crop.
We think the liability will be less here than in scenario 3.
Liability also will be less than in scenario 2, we think, because here
the actor does not intend the harm but only risks it. This is an
application of the principle noted in our earlier work that greater
punishment is due for greater culpable state of mind: 53 Intending to
burn is more culpable than intending to create a risk of burning, all
other things being equal. Offenses like this commonly are termed
"endangerment" offenses. No claim of justification is at issue in the
scenario.
These four cases present variations of the culpability and harm
variables, as evidenced in Table 1.

53. See id. at studies 8, 9, 16.
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TABLE 1. INTERRELATION OF CONTRAST CASES 1 THROUGH

Intentional

Reckless

4

Harm

No Harm

Scenario 1
Substantive Offense

Scenario 2
Attempt

Scenario 3
Reckless Offense

Scenario 4
Endangerment

Scenario 5. Attempted Risk Creation-Attempted Endangerment
In scenario 5 the actor thinks he is creating a criminal risk, but in
fact no such risk is created. In other words, it is a case of attempted
endangerment rather than the actual endangerment of scenario 4:
Despite [the danger of high winds], Jake burns his trash pile,
hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's crop. It turns
out that the weather forecast was in error about the wind.
Jake's burning never creates any danger to his neighbor's
field.
We think it will have even less liability than scenario 4. In
scenario 4, a risk of the harm was in fact created, while here no such
risk is created; the actor only mistakenly believes that it is created.
Scenario 5 (risk intended but no risk occurs) bears the same relation
to scenario 4 (risk intended and risk occurs) that scenario 2 (burning
intended but does not occur) bears to scenario 1 (burning intended
and occurs). No claim of justification is at issue in the scenario.
Scenario 6. Intentional Justified Burning
In scenario 6, the final contrast case, the burning occurs but is
clearly justified, under both a reasons and a deeds theory. Not only
do the objective circumstances actually exist that make the burning
the right thing to do, but the actor knows of the justifying
circumstances and acts because of them:
Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and
the local town and that the fire is burning toward the town
and endangering the people who live there. He can see the
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smoke from the approaching fire and calculates that if he
bums his neighbor's corn crop he can create a firebreak that
will stop the fire. (Remember that Jake's own field is not
located where it could serve as a firebreak.) Jake knows
that his neighbor is not available to ask for permission, and
he burns the fields. The fire destroys the entire crop.
Because of his quick work the town and its inhabitants are
saved.
We think Jake will get a complete defense in this scenario.
B.

The Test Cases

We now turn to the scenarios that discriminate between the two
competing theories. As described above, a subject's response to each
of these cases is compared to her response to one or more of the
contrast cases relevant from the point of view of the competing
theories. It is from this comparison that we infer the subject's views.
Scenario 7. Unknowingly Justified Burning
Scenario 7 is the case of the unknowingly justified actor:
Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that
his neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three
acres of corn. Because the field is bounded on all sides by
dirt roads, it is clear that the burning will create no danger
beyond that of destroying the neighbor's corn. The fire
destroys the entire crop. Unbeknown to Jake, lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and
the local town and the fire is burning toward the town and
endangering the people who live there. His burning the
field creates a firebreak: The town and its inhabitants are
saved.
Recall that the deeds theory, which we think better represents
community views, predicts this liability to be similar to that of
scenario 2, the attempt case. The actor's liability is based entirely
upon his intention to burn without justification, the classic rationale
for punishing an attempt. The reasons theory predicts that the actor
will have no defense and therefore will be liable for the full offense,
the same liability as in scenario 1.
Scenario 8. Knowingly Justified Burning but with Bad Motive
Scenario 8 is a case in which the justifying circumstances exist
and the actor knows about them, but he acts for a bad motive, rather
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than for a justificatory purpose:
Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and
the local town and that the fire is burning toward the town
and endangering the people who live there. He can see the
smoke from the approaching fire and calculates that if he
burns his neighbor's corn crop he can create a firebreak that
will stop the fire. (Remember that Jake's own field is not
located where it could serve as a firebreak.) Jake has no
interest in saving the town; the townspeople have always
been unfriendly to him. Further, Jake is angry with his
neighbor over a dispute about use of water from a creek
that the two share. He decides to use the fire as an excuse
to burn his neighbor's corn crop. Without asking his
neighbor for permission, he burns the fields. The fire
destroys the entire crop. Because of his quick work the
town and its inhabitants are saved.
This scenario is an interesting case because, recall from Part I.B.,
most jurisdictions implement the reasons theory by defense
formulations that require only that the actor "believe" that the
justifying circumstances exist.54 They do not require that the actor
act for the justifying "purpose," even though "purpose" is a standard
culpability level commonly required by other criminal law doctrines.
Contrary to the legal rules, which give the same complete
defense for both a justificatory purpose and mere knowledge of the
justifying circumstances, we think the community will find a
difference between the two cases. We predict that the person who
acts for the justificatory purpose, as in scenario 6, will receive a
complete defense (no liability), whereas the person who acts knowing
only of the justifying circumstances but with a purpose other than to
avoid the greater harm, as in scenario 8, will have some level of
liability imposed.
A strict reasons theory might give no defense here. While the
actor knew of the justifying circumstances, they were not his reason
for acting. But the reasons theory as adopted in current law treats
this actor as fully justified, thus imposing no liability.
The deeds theory would give this actor a significant discount
from full liability, at least as great as that given the unknowingly
justified actor, because while his motive may be bad, his conduct is
objectively justified. On the other hand, the actor in scenario 8 at
least does not think that he is causing a net harm, and therefore we
54. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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think will have less liability than the unknowingly justified actor of
scenario 7, who does think so.-'
These first two test scenarios present variations on the
unknowingly justified actor. The next three scenarios consider the
reverse case of the actor who mistakenly believes he is justified. The
person setting the fire thinks that he has a justification for doing so,
but his reasons for thinking this become increasingly poorly
grounded.
Scenario 9. Mistake as to Justification, Reasonable
Scenario 9 presents the case of a reasonable mistake as to a
justification:
Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and
the local town and that the fire is burning toward the town
and endangering the people who live there. In the past,
Citizen's Band radio reports have often been true, but also
often false. Jake stops two cars that are racing into town,
and both confirm that "there is a big, out of control fire,
heading this way." (Any reasonable person would think
there was a destructive fire coming.) Jake can see the
smoke from the approaching fire and calculates that if he
burns his neighbor's corn crop he can create a firebreak that
will stop the fire. (Remember that Jake's own field is not
located where it could serve as a firebreak.) Jake knows
that his neighbor is not available to ask for permission, and
he burns the fields. The fire destroys the entire crop. It
turns out that the radio report was in error. The smoke was
from a controlled burn being done by a crew of local
foresters and presented no danger to the town or any of the
surrounding area.
Both deeds and reasons theories would give a complete defense.
Only the labeling would be different. The deeds theory would
consider the actor excused; the reasons theory would consider the
actor justified. 56 All jurisdictions agree that a full defense is
appropriate in this case; no issue of mitigation arises. Both the deeds
theory, which we support, and the reasons theory predict no liability.

55. Recall that the deeds theory relies upon attempt liability as the source of liability
for the unknowingly justified actor. When an actor does not think that he is acting
unjustifiably (he knows of the justifying circumstances), it is unclear that attempt liability
is appropriate.
56. See supratext accompanying notes 22-23.
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Scenario 10. Mistake as to Justification, Negligent
Scenario 10 is a case of a negligent mistake as to a justification,
differing from scenario 9 as follows:
In the past, Citizen's Band radio reports have often been
true, but also often false. Jake doesn't think of this, and
although a reasonable person would do so, Jake doesn't
think to check on the truth of the report, but there is no
doubt in his mind that it is a dangerous fire. Jake can see
the smoke from the approaching fire and calculates that if
he burns his neighbor's corn crop he can create a firebreak
that will stop the fire.
Those jurisdictions that require a reasonable mistake for a
defense, a majority of reasons theory jurisdictions, would deny any
defense here and would impose full liability, as in scenario 1. The
jurisdictions that do recognize a mitigation for an unreasonable
mistake as to a justification, which includes the few deeds
jurisdictions, will impose more liability than the complete defense in
scenario 6, but notably less than the full liability of scenario 1 that the
majority view predicts.
Scenario 11. Mistake as to Justification, Reckless
Scenario 11 is a case of a reckless mistake as to a justification,
when there is greater culpable state of mind than in scenario 10, but
the actor still honestly and sincerely believes that he is acting
justifiably. It differs from scenarios 9 and 10 as follows:
In the past, Citizen's Band radio reports have often been
true, but also often false. Jake remembers this fact, and
realizes there might not be a dangerous fire, but doesn't
check on the truth of the report. He can see the smoke from
the approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his
neighbor's corn crop he can create a firebreak that will stop
the fire.
The majority all-or-nothing approach again would give no
defense and would impose full liability, as in scenario 1. The
mitigation approach again would give a mitigation from full liability,
although not as much as the mitigation given in scenario 10. Thus, we
predict that the liability here will be greater than that in scenario 10,
but markedly less than that in scenario 1.
Our predictions and those consistent with current law are
summarized in Table 2. Generally, we think the subjects will agree
with the predictions of the deeds theory and with mitigations for
unreasonable mistakes as to a justification.
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TABLE 2.
SUMMARY OF LIABILITY PREDICTIONS
CONTRAST CASES
Expectation

Scenario
1. Intentional commission
of substantive offense
2. Attempt

Baseline

3. Reckless commission

<1

4. Endangerment

< 2 and 3

5. Attempted endangerment

<4

6. Justified commission

No liability

<1

TEST CASES

Scenario

7. Unknowingly
justified burning
8. Justifying knowledge
without justificatory
purpose
9. Reasonable mistake

as to justification
(MJ)
10. Negligent MJ
11. Reckless MJ

Our Predictions
(Deeds Theory)

Predictions Consistent
with Current Law
(Reasons Theory)

=1
=2
(attempted burning) (no defense; full liability)
=6
> 6, but < 7
(complete justification)

(complete excuse)

6
justification)
(complete

> 6, but < 1

=1

=

6

=

(no defense; full liability)
= 1
> 6 and 10, but < 1
(no defense;

full liability)
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IV. LIABILITY RESULTS
The mean liability for each of the scenarios is set out in Table 3.
TABLE 3.
LIABILITY MEANS
Scenario

Liability
Mean

Imprisonment
Equivalent

Contrast Cases
1. Intentional (unjustified) burning

4.65

-

2. Attempted (unjustified) burning

3.52

- 4 months

3. Created risk of (unjustified)
burning, realized
4. Created risk of (unjustified)
burning, unrealized
5. Attempted risk creation

2.69

-

0.48

6. Intentional justified burning

0.57

essentially
no punishment
essentially
no punishment
essentially
no punishment

0.42

10 months
6 weeks

Test Cases

A.

7. Unknowingly justified burning

3.63

- 4 months

8. Knowingly justified burning
but with bad motive
9. Mistake as to justification, reasonable

2.10

- 2 weeks

1.10

-

2 days

10. Mistake as to justification, negligent

2.02

-

2 weeks

11. Mistake as to justification, reckless

2.33

-

4 weeks

The Contrast Cases

We begin with an examination of the results for the cases that
were designed to provide comparative information for the test cases.
The scenario 1 contrast case of intentional burning with no claim of
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justification has a liability mean of 4.65 (equivalent to about ten

months imprisonment).5 7 This result is what one might expect given
the nature of the offense, a property offense in which no risk to
persons is created.
The scenario 2 contrast, the attempt case, has a liability of 3.52
(just over four months). This result is consistent with our expectation
of substantially reduced punishment based solely on the fortuitous
absence of the intended harm. Indeed, the ratio of penalties between
scenarios 1 and 2 is consistent with those jurisdictions that set the
grade of an attempt as one grade less than or half the penalty of the
substantive offense."8 Recall that on our exponential penalty scale,
one unit is equivalent to one offense grade in a typical modem
American criminal code and that each higher grade typically doubles
the penalty of the previous grade. 9
Scenario 3, in which the actor creates a risk of burning that is
realized, has a liability of 2.69 (6.2 weeks). As predicted, it is less
than the liability in scenario 1; here the actor does not intend the
harm, but only risks it. The importance of this difference in
culpability level often is reflected by corresponding differences in
penalties. For example, in homicide cases, this same culpability
difference results in an intentional killing being punished as murder
with long-term or life imprisonment or death, while a reckless killing
is punished as manslaughter with a maximum penalty more in the
range of ten years.6
Scenario 4, a case of risk creation in which the harm risked goes
unrealized, receives a liability of 0.48, which is essentially no
punishment (a liability mean of 1.0 is equivalent to one day
imprisonment). No liability was assigned by 36.5% of subjects.
Another 42.3% gave liability but no punishment. The remaining
21.2% gave punishment ranging from one day to six months. The
deeds theory predicted low liability, from the concurrence of both the
discount for no resulting harm seen in scenario 2, and the discount for
lower culpability level seen in scenario 3. We have discussed
elsewhere this additive nature of different discounts from the full

57. More precise translation from liability means to imprisonment terms can be
obtained by using the table in ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 45, app. C at 283.
58. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1995)

(citing statutes).
59. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(2) (1985) (making manslaughter a second
degree felony); id. § 6.06(2) (setting the maximum term of imprisonment for second
degree felonies at 10 years).
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intentional substantive offense. 61 The liability result here seems a
neat accumulation of the 1.1 discount from the full offense seen in
scenario 2 and the 2.0 discount seen in scenario 3. Thus, a perfectly
additive discount would be 3.1. The liability result here shows a 3.2
discount. It seems unlikely, however, that this additive discounting
always will be quite so neat. This substantial reduction is consistent
with current law's treatment of such matters. In homicide, for
example, creating a risk of death that is unrealized is punished as
endangerment, which typically carries a maximum sentence of only
one year,12 compared to life imprisonment or death for murder.
Scenario 5 presents the case of attempted endangerment. As
expected, the liability mean is low, 0.42. The result is only slightly
less than the result in scenario 4 (endangerment), and that small
difference is not statistically significant. We predicted a difference
between the two, with scenario 5 less than scenario 4, to reflect the
absence in scenario 5 of the risk that in fact is created in scenario 4.
Our assumption is that the difference does not appear because the
scenario 4 liability is already so low no further reduction is possible.
In scenario 4, 78.8% of the subjects imposed no punishment. That
leaves little room to distinguish scenario 5 as a case of even less
blameworthiness. (In scenario 5, 86.5% imposed no punishment.) If
scenarios with a more serious base offense were used, such as
homicide, the distinction we expected here might appear.
Scenario 6, the final contrast case, is an intentional justified
burning. As expected, it received essentially no punishment. Its
liability mean was 0.57. No liability was assigned by 38.5% of the
subjects. Another 40.4% gave liability but no punishment. The
remaining 21.2% gave punishment ranging from one day to one year.
This baseline is not as low as we might have guessed but still reflects
the predicted judgment that the vast majority of subjects see this as a
case of little or no blameworthiness, despite the fact that an
intentional harm is caused.
To summarize the contrast case results, the results came out as
we predicted. Those predictions, it will be remembered, were based
on two principles: a liability discount given when the harm risked did
not actually occur, and a liability discount given as the harm risked
61. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Objectivist vs. Subjectivist Views of
Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in CriminalLaw Theory, 18 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1998).
62. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (making reckless endangerment a
misdemeanor); id. § 6.08 (setting the maximum term of imprisonment for misdemeanors
at one year).
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was altered from intentional, to reckless, to justified.
The Casesfor Which the Theories of JustificationHave Different
Predictions
The first two test cases examine the community's views on cases
critical to the deeds-reason debate. In scenario 7, presenting the
unknowingly justified actor, the two theories predict starkly different
results, and the deeds theory predictions are confirmed. The
perpetrator in scenario 7 received a liability mean of 3.63 (just over
four months). This result is not statistically different from the
attempt contrast case in scenario 2, as the deeds theory predicts.
Such liability is dramatically less than the 4.65 liability (about ten
months) for the substantive offense that the reasons theory predicts.
The deeds theory is clearly more consistent with community views on
this matter.
Scenario 8 presents the case of the actor who knows of the
justifying circumstances but who acts for other, non-justificatory
motives. Recall that current law would give a complete defense in
such a case, although logic would seem to suggest that a strict reasons
theory would give no defense. 63 The liability mean is 2.10 (2.6
weeks), not the complete defense that current law would provideonly 7.8% of our subjects assigned a verdict of no liability-and not
the full liability that the reasons theory logically would seem to
suggest. It is consistent, however, with the deeds theory prediction of
liability being somewhat less than that of the unknowingly justified
actor. The actor is entitled to at least the discount given the
unknowingly justified actor because his act is objectively justified; a
greater harm is in fact avoided. Unlike the unknowingly justified
actor, however, this actor's liability for attempt is less clear. His
knowledge of the justifying circumstances may suggest to him that his
conduct is not in fact criminal, thus he does not have the clear
intention to violate the law that the unknowingly justified actor has.
He might be viewed less as breaking the law than as taking advantage
of it. In any case, the results again are consistent with the deeds view
and inconsistent with the reasons view.
Turn next to the three scenarios in which the perpetrator,
mistakenly believing that the town was in danger of a fire, set his
neighbor's fields on fire to provide a firebreak. The reasonableness
of the mistake varied across these three scenarios. Scenario 9
presents the case of a reasonable mistake as to a justification. Both
B.

63. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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reasons and deeds theories would give a complete defense. Our
subjects assigned liability of 1.10 (2.3 days), which was higher than we
expected. Further, only 17.3% gave the complete defense verdict of
"not guilty." On the other hand, 42.3% assigned liability but no
punishment. Perhaps these subjects were concerned about the
implications of giving a complete defense in a case in which the
conduct in fact is not justified in an objective sense. There is reason
to think that they should be concerned, as discussed in Section V.C.
below, which presents our proposal to revise acquittal verdicts.
Scenarios 10 and 11 are cases of unreasonable mistakes as to a
justification. In scenario 10, the actor honestly believes his conduct is
justified but is mistaken, and his mistake is negligent rather than
reasonable. That is, a reasonable person in the actor's situation
would have been aware of a risk that the contemplated conduct was
not justified. In scenario 11, the actor similarly honestly believes his
conduct is justified and is similarly wrong. But here his mistake is
more culpable; he is reckless. That is, he is aware of a risk that his
conduct might not be justified, although, on balance, he concludes
that it is justified. He disregards the risk (that the conduct might not
be justified) and proceeds with the conduct. In other words, he
makes a reckless mistake as to a justification.
As expected, the subjects imposed greater liability in these two
cases than in the case of the reasonable mistake. Further, liability
was greater in the case of greater culpability in making the mistake:
2.02 (two weeks) for the negligent mistake, 2.33 (about four weeks)
for the reckless mistake. But this range of liability is considerably
less than that imposed by current law's majority rule, which denies
any defense or mitigation and imposes full substantive liability. In
the context of this burning offense, current law's assignment of no
defense would give the perpetrator ten months imprisonment, as
imposed in scenario 1, not the two weeks and four weeks that
scenarios 10 and 11, respectively, actually received. We conclude that
the subjects would very much support recognition of mitigations for
unreasonable mistakes as to a justification. 64 These results suggest
64. Recall the correlation in law between the reasons theory liability for the
unknowingly justified actor and the all-or-nothing approach to mistake as to a justification
(denying a mitigation for an unreasonable mistake as to a justification). See supra text
accompanying notes 24-28. We reasoned that nothing in the reasons theory logically
requires adherence to the all-or-nothing view. Our study results seem to confirm this
speculation. The persons in our sample closest to the reasons theory-those that gave the
smallest discounts to the unknowingly justified actor in scenario 7, as against the full
liability of scenario 1-were neither significantly higher nor lower in their liability
assignments in unreasonable mistake scenarios, 10 and 11, than the other subjects.
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that the Model Penal Code's mitigations of this sort should not have

been rejected so regularly by state criminal code drafters. 5
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM

With the results current in the reader's mind, we turn
immediately to the question of how criminal codes might be modified

in light of the community intuitions reported here.

The results

reported in the previous section confirm that much is right in current

criminal law formulation. But the results also frequently challenge
criminal code formulations and suggest a variety of criminal law
reforms. These alterations would involve a reformulation of offense
definitions, altered formulations of what count as defenses, and an
altered system of trial verdicts.
A.

The Formulationand Gradingof Offenses
While the study was designed to examine defenses related to

65. For scenarios 9, 10, and 11, we added one more dependent measure that provides
some illumination of our respondents' reactions to these scenarios, and perhaps of their
reactions to other scenarios as well. In all of the scenarios in which the neighbor's fields
actually burned, there is one individual who is obviously the innocent victim of events,
and that of course is the neighbor who lost his crop. We asked respondents "what should
be done" about the neighbor's loss. A number of respondents wrote that the neighbor
should be compensated for his loss. (Recall that the instructions made clear that the loss
was a significant one, moving the farm from a profit to a loss.) As the culpability for the
loss in these cases altered, so too did the identity of the individuals who owed the
neighbor compensation. When the perpetrator made a reasonable mistake, respondents
thought that the town should share in the task of providing compensation, although the
perpetrator, who had made the mistake, also owed compensation. When the mistake was
described as negligent, and then reckless, more of the respondents thought the burden of
providing compensation fell solely on the perpetrator, and not on the townspeople.
As we noted before, we had expected some judgments of no liability and instead
found judgments of liability of a very minor sort. An impulse toward finding
compensation for the victim may explain this difference. Testing this possibility, we
added a question about compensation to scenario 6, in which setting fire to the neighbor's
fields was completely justified because it prevented the oncoming fire from destroying the
town, and we gave this scenario to six new respondents, who first responded to the
compensation question and then to the liability question. The responses of these new
subjects were quite revealing. As to compensation, all thought compensation was due and
that the townsfolk should be the major source of it. Several suggested, as a more than
token gesture of community, that the farmer who set the fire should give some of his crop
to the neighbor. Whether they felt that this was "owed" or simply a wise and neighborly
gesture on the farmer's part was not clear. After dealing with the compensation issue,
respondents felt that the question of liability was moot. Pressed to answer, respondents
generally decided that "not guilty" was the appropriate verdict. One suggested "no
liability." What those verdicts suggest is that, having required the defendant to pay some
compensation, the respondents thought that adding criminal liability would generate
excessive total punishment.
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justification, the results, specifically those in the contrast cases, reveal
something about how the law ought to define offenses. In many
respects, the results support the general approach of current law.
A comparison of scenarios 1 and 2 illustrates that, although the
actor's conduct and culpable state of mind are the same in the two
cases, the existence of a resulting harm matters greatly in assessing
liability and punishment. This outcome confirms findings in our
earlier studies.66 It provides grounds to criticize the minority of state
criminal codes that follow the Model Penal Code in grading attempts
the same as the substantive offense. 67 The Code would have graded
the offenses in scenarios 1 and 2 the same, but our subjects gave the
attempt less than half of the punishment of the completed offense.
A comparison of the results in scenarios 1 and 3, as well as in
scenarios 2 and 4, confirms current law's view that the actor's
culpability level ought to have a large effect on degree of liability.
Again, these findings are consistent with the findings in different
contexts found in our previous studies. 68 Intentionally causing or
trying to cause a harm is dramatically more blameworthy than being
reckless as to causing the same harm. This norm supports current
law's grading of offenses according to culpability level, as in
homicide-intentional killing (murder) is graded more seriously than
reckless killing (manslaughter).
But given the near universality of this rule, it also may be
appropriate to criticize current law for limiting the use of culpability
levels in grading to a few serious offenses. The results suggest that an
actor's culpability level is significant in offenses far less serious than
homicide. Even in the pure property offenses tested here, the effect
of culpability level was dramatic. The intentional burning received
more than seven times the punishment of the reckless burning.69
Each point on our liability scale is equivalent to approximately one
grade in a modern American criminal code. Thus, if the results here
were followed, reckless burning would be graded two grades less than
intentional burning. Current law, in contrast, typically grades
intentional and reckless (and negligent) burning the same.70
66. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 45, at studies 1, 17.
67. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-51

(West 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4(a) (West 1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 905(a) (West 1972 & Supp. 1997).
68. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 45, at studies 8, 9, 16.
69. Compare scenario l's ten months to scenario 3's six weeks.
70. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1)(a). Grading differences are based
exclusively on the value of the property damaged. See id. § 220.3(2).
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The Formulationof Defenses

The results in the contrast cases also tell us something about
defenses. A comparison of the results in scenarios 1 and 6 shows
clearly that a "lesser evils defense," as it is called, has strong intuitive
support among the subjects. A plain language version of the defense
might read like this: "You may act in a way that would otherwise be
a crime if your conduct is necessary to avoid a more serious harm or
evil than that caused by your conduct."'" About half of American
jurisdictions do not yet recognize such a defense, 7 and many of those
that have recognized the defense in one case or another have
declined to codify it, leaving its availability and formulation in
doubt. 73 The strength of intuitive support for the defense suggests
that it ought to be formally recognized through codification
everywhere.
The five test cases offer the most important new information
with implications for criminal law reform. As noted in the previous
section, the results in scenario 7, as compared to scenarios 1 and 2,
suggest that the unknowingly justified actor ought to be treated as an
attempter, not as a perpetrator of a full substantive offense. He has
in fact avoided a greater harm; there is no net harm. An objective
formulation of justification defenses, like the one quoted in the
paragraph above, would achieve this result, for it would give a
justification defense to the unknowingly justified actor, who would
then be liable only for attempt under a provision like the Model
Penal Code's: "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission
of the crime, he purposely engages in conduct which would constitute
the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to
be ... ."7 Under the circumstances as the unknowingly justified
actor believes them to be, he is committing the crime; hence, he is
liable for an attempt to commit the crime.
In addition to justification defenses objectively defined, the law
must provide a defense provision governing mistake as to a
justification that would give a defense to the actor who mistakenly
believes her conduct is justified. The results of scenario 8, as
compared to scenario 6, suggest that such a provision should be
71. Paul H. Robinson et al., Making CriminalCodes Functional: A Code of Conduct
and a Code of Adjudication, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 304 app. A, § 67, at 344
(1996).
72. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 124, at 45 n.1 (citing authorities).
73. See 2 id.

74.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 5.01(1)(a).
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formulated to give a complete defense only if the actor acts for the
justificatory purpose; it ought not be enough that she simply knows of
the justifying circumstances, if these were not her reason for acting.
As noted above, only 7.8% of our subjects gave a defense to an actor
who knew of the justifying circumstances but acted out for a
different, malevolent motive. This result suggests that a complete
defense ought to be given not when an actor "believes her conduct is
necessary to avoid a threatened greater harm," but only when she
engages in the offense conduct "in order to avoid a threatened
greater harm."
The question remains, however, whether such an increased
defense requirement has practical utility. It is not impossible, but
certainly difficult, for a court to know whether an actor acts for the
proper purpose. An actor who knows of the justifying circumstances
generally would have little difficulty persuading a court that those
circumstances are the source of her motivation. Further, the case in
which the justificatory purpose is not present, as in scenario 8, will be
rare. All things considered, it may not be worth the trouble to have
the defense formulation distinguish between purpose and simple
belief.
The real dispute in formulating the mistake-as-to-a-justification
defense is whether to allow a mitigation for an unreasonable mistake.
As noted above, the results in scenarios 10 and 11 show that our
subjects give a significant mitigation in such cases from the full
liability given in scenario 1. The current law's majority rule, then, is
badly out of step with our subjects' views. In the case of a reckless
mistake, our subjects would give one-tenth the liability given for the
full offense.' For a negligent mistake, our subjects would give onetwentieth of that for the full offense.76 These are substantial
mitigations, in cases in which current law commonly gives none.
How might code drafters incorporate this mitigation approach
into defenses for mistake as to a justification? The basic defense
might read something like the following: "An actor is excused for
her conduct constituting an offense if her conduct would be justified
had the attendant circumstances been as she believed them to be."
The effect of this provision would be to provide a mistake-as-to-ajustification excuse to a person who honestly believed her conduct to
be justified. Another provision would then impose liability upon
those actors whose mistakes were culpable, varying the level of
75. Compare results of scenarios 1 and 11.
76. Compare results of scenarios 1 and 10.
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provision might provide: "When an actor is reckless or negligent in
assessing the circumstances that justify her conduct, the mistake-asto-a-justification excuse [quoted above] is not available for an offense
for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, is sufficient
to establish liability. '78 Thus, a person who intentionally kills another
believing that such killing is justified but who is reckless in having
such a belief, would be liable only for reckless homicide
(manslaughter), not intentional homicide (murder). A person who is
negligent in so believing would be liable only for negligent
homicide.79
C. Reform of Acquittal Verdict Forms
Recall the peculiar results in scenario 9, in which the actor
makes an entirely reasonable mistake, is blameless, and few subjects
imposed any significant punishment, yet only 17.3% gave the actor a
defense. If the subjects thought that no punishment is appropriate,
why would they impose liability?
One argument made in support of the deeds theory is that it
helps make a distinction that is important to effective operation of
criminal justice: the distinction between (1) conduct not punished
because it is the right thing to do, it avoids a greater harm, and we
would want it to be performed under similar circumstances in the
future, and (2) conduct not punished because, while it is wrong, it
does not avoid a greater harm, and we would not want it performed
in similar circumstances in the future, the actor in fact is blameless
for performing the wrongful conduct. Recall from the introduction
of this Article that this is the classic distinction between a
justification and an excuse. The deeds theory allows this distinction
to be made manifest by distinguishing cases of mistake as to a

77. This is the structural approach of the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL

§ 3.09(2).
78. This language is modeled after Model Penal Code § 3.09(2). See id. It suffers
from a number of technical problems that are beyond the scope of this Article. See
ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 463-64 (discussing these technical problems).
79. Unfortunately, this approach to drafting a mitigation provision is dependent upon
the criminal code having different culpability levels for most offenses. That is a
CODE

suggestion that we urge above, but it is not true of most modem criminal codes. When no
lesser grade for a lower culpability existed, the actor would get a complete defense under
this approach, even for a reckless mistake. That would be a very undesirable result.
Another approach, not dependent on the proper structuring of offense definitions, would
give a set mitigation (for example, one offense grade-for a reckless mistake) and a
greater mitigation (two offense grades) for a negligent mistake.
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justification from cases of objective justification, labeling the former
excuses and only the latter justifications.
Under this approach, an actor acquitted under a justification
defense provides an example to others of conduct that they are free
to repeat in similar circumstances in the future. An actor excused
under a mistake-as-to-a-justification excuse, in contrast, provides an
example to others of conduct that they ought not perform in similar
circumstances in the future. The actor is being acquitted despite her
wrongful conduct. The reasons theory, by combining truly justified
conduct with mistake as to a justification, terming both "justified,"
makes it impossible to make this distinction.
This tension between judging the actor and judging the act may
well have influenced our subjects in scenario 9, in which 71.2% gave
the actor essentially no punishment-either no liability, liability but
no punishment, or one day imprisonment, which might have been
seen as a symbolic gesture.80 If no punishment is the strong majority
view of the group, why did only 17.3% give the complete defense
verdict of "not guilty," thus imposing no liability at all? They may
well have been concerned about the precedential effect of such
outright acquittals, the message that it would send to others. Would
it be taken to weaken the prohibition against such burnings
generally?
That is certainly a danger in a system like the current one, which
does not distinguish between justified conduct, which the law is
happy to have repeated by others in similar circumstances, and
excused conduct, which the law does not want repeated. Both cases
are acquitted under current practice with the same verdict, "not
guilty." If the only choice available is "not guilty," with no
justification or excuse distinction, jurors are likely to feel
uncomfortable acquitting in cases of excuse, for fear of the ease with
which the verdict can be misunderstood. On the other hand, they
also would feel uncomfortable exposing a person they thought
blameless to substantial punishment with a "guilty" verdict.8
We offered our subjects a way out of this dilemma, and they
embraced it. They were offered a choice of "liability but no
punishment," which gave them the opportunity to avoid punishing a
blameless actor but also to condemn the conduct as something that

80. Of all the subjects, 86.5% fit into these three categories for the contrast case of
actual justified burning.
81. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 146-48

(1997).
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ought not be repeated.
While this approach is a useful research device and has revealed
interesting information, it is not a solution to the practical problem in
real life, for juries have little role in the sentencing process. Once
they give a verdict of "liability" of any sort, it is for the court to
sentence. The offense for which the jury convicts sets a statutory
maximum above which the sentencing judge cannot go, but, unless
they give a defense, they cannot otherwise assure that the actor will
get no punishment or only symbolic punishment, as our study allows
its subjects. Further, the "liability but no punishment" option has the
disadvantage of imposing liability on a blameless defendant. In the
real world, where criminal conviction can bring moral condemnation
and stigmatization, as well as other collateral disadvantages in jobs,
licensing, and the like, such liability is unfair. Thus, even if jurors had
sentencing power, this solution to the problem-liability with no
punishment-has the effect of imposing the condemnation and
stigma of criminal conviction on a blameless offender who does not
deserve it. We force jurors between the two bad choices of doing
injustice or undermining the prohibition against such conduct in the
future.
The better resolution is to recognize formally distinct acquittal
verdicts of "justified" and "excused," in which the former approves of
the actor's conduct and the latter disapproves of it. An objectively
justified actor receives a verdict of "justified," thereby approving of
the conduct, while the actor who mistakenly believes she is justified is
"excused," thereby disapproving of the conduct. One of us has
elsewhere offered the details for such a verdict system. z
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The results reported here illustrate the potential usefulness of
social science research for illuminating issues concerning the
formulation of criminal codes. If the code drafters are interested in
knowing the moral intuitions of the community that the codes will
govern, then the sort of careful, empirical social science study of the
sort conducted here is the preferred mechanism for discovering those
intuitions. Properly constructed studies can resolve competing claims
among criminal law theorists over which theory or rule better accords
with people's intuitions of justice. Here we conclude that the deeds
theory of justification better accords with community views than does
the reasons theory.
82. See id. at 204-07.

1136

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Further, such studies also generate specific reform proposals that
would make the criminal justice system more just in its operation.
The results in this study suggest a reformulation of many aspects of
offense definitions, reforms to justification defenses and mitigations
for mistake as to a justification, and reforms of jury acquittal verdicts.
On our examination, and, we hope, on the reader's examination,
these suggestions for reform appear coherent and are ones that
adequately balance the competing considerations that govern
judgments about these difficult cases in which the reason for and the
outcome of the perpetrator's acts are in conflict. They are, in other
words, reasonable candidates for code adoption. Reforms of this
sort, that bring criminal law's principles of justice closer to those of
the community, we argue, increase the law's moral credibility, which
in turn increases its long-term effectiveness in crime control.

1998]

THEORIES OFJUSTIFICATION

1137

APPENDIX: STIMULUS STORIES

As we all know, in different circumstances, some actions can
generate criminal liability while very similar others do not. Below
are a number of cases in which a person sets a fire, for a number of
different reasons, and under a number of different circumstances.
Your task is to judge whether the act, in each of the specific stories
that you read, should count as an offense generating criminal liability
or not. If you decide that it is a offense that should generate liability,
you will then assign it a punishment of whatever magnitude makes
sense to you, or you may decide that even though it is a criminal act,
you want to assign it no punishment.
Here is how you will register your judgments. You will always
make your judgment by responding to the scale that we furnish below
each case. Glance at the sample scale just below this paragraph now.
After you read a specific scenario, circle "N" if you think the person
has committed something that ordinarily would be considered a
crime, but he has an acceptable justification for what he did and so
should get no criminal liability. Circle "0" if you think the person
has done something that generates criminal liability but should not
receive any punishment. Otherwise choose a sentence from the other
options. Work through the set of cases, giving us your opinionsthere are no right answers. Take as much time as you need to go
through the set of cases. (The numbers in front of each scenario are
random, and simply tell us the source of the scenario. Ignore them.)
Background Information for all of the scenarios.
Jake is a farmer who has already harvested his corn crop. His
neighbor has not done so, so his three acres of corn is still in the
fields. The corn crop makes the difference, for these farmers,
between having a profitable season because they have winter feed for
their animals, or going into debt.
Running around several sides of Jake and his neighbor's fields
are dirt roads. Jake's farm and his neighbor's farm are on a neck of
land that stretches out into a lake. Out on the end of the neck of land
is the local town. Jake's neighbor's fields cut the town off from the
mainland, but Jake's fields do not. The following map shows you this
layout.
[See FIGuRE 1.]

Now read the stories. Please circle the rating that corresponds
with YOUR OPINION about what the appropriate sentence (if any)
should be for Jake in each case. These cases will differ slightly, so it

1138

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

is important that you read the entire case before making a judgment
about sentencing. If you think that the difference between two
scenarios is important, you should assign different amounts of
punishment to Jake as a result of that difference. But you may find
some differences between scenarios to be unimportant, in terms of
the amount of punishment, and it is quite all right if you assign them
the same amount of punishment.
Some people have trouble thinking about punishments in terms
of prison sentences. Our real question to you is what punishment
Jake deserves for the act he committed, using the scale as a vehicle to
express your beliefs. So you may want to think about the amount of
punishment you think the act deserves as equivalent to a prison
sentence of a particular length, and then assign that length sentence.
For example, you may think a two-week prison sentence is equivalent
to a $10,000 fine, and hence circle a "2" to indicate that relative
amount of punishment.
After reading and assigning a sentence to a later case, you might
want to change your punishment ratings of one or more previous
cases. You are free to do so. Remember, we are interested in
knowing the liability and sentence YOU THINK SHOULD BE
ASSIGNED in each case: there are no right and wrong answers and
your responses will be kept completely confidential.
1. Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that his
neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three acres of corn.
Because the field is bounded on all sides by dirt roads, and there is no
wind, it is clear that the burning will create no danger beyond that of
destroying the corn. The fire destroys the entire crop.
N

0

1

noliab. liab.
Iday
but no
punish.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2wks

2 mo

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15yr

30yr

life
death
imprisonment

11

2. Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that his
neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three acres of corn.
Because the field is bounded on all sides by dirt roads, and there is no
wind, it is clear that the burning will create no danger beyond that of
destroying the corn. Just as Jake sets the fire, the neighbor
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unexpectedly returns and puts it out before it does any harm.
0

N

noliab. liab.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Iday

2wks

2mo

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15yr

30yr

life

death

imprisonment

but no
punish.

3. Like all of the local farmers, Jake routinely piles dry
cornhusks near where they are cut and eventually burns them. Jake
has one such pile near his neighbor's fields. Jake wants to get the pile
burned quickly; the previous year he waited and the pile got soaked
by rain. He is aware that high winds are forecast for today; winds
that create a real risk that his fire will jump the gap between his trash
pile and his neighbor's corn fields. Despite this danger, Jake burns
his trash pile, hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's crop.
The winds come and the fire jumps to his neighbor's crop. The fire
destroys the entire crop.
1

0

N

Iday
noliab. liab.
but no
punish.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

2wks

2mo

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15yr

30yr

life
imprisonment

death

4. Like all of the local farmers, Jake routinely piles dry
cornhusks near where they are cut and eventually burns them. Jake
has one such pile near his neighbor's fields. Jake wants to get the pile
burned quickly; the previous year he waited and the pile got soaked
by rain. He is aware that high winds are forecast for today; winds
that create a real risk that his fire will jump the gap between his trash
pile and his neighbor's corn fields. Despite this danger, Jake burns
his trash pile, hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's crop.
The winds come but, Jake is lucky, the fire does not jump to his
neighbor's crop.
0

N

noliab. liab.
but no
punish.

5.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

lday

2wks

2mo

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15yr

30yr

life

death

imprisonment

Like all of the local farmers, Jake routinely piles dry
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cornhusks near where they are cut and eventually burns them. Jake
has one such pile near his neighbor's fields. Jake wants to get the pile
burned quickly; the previous year he waited and the pile got soaked
by rain. He is aware that high winds are forecast for today; winds
that create a real risk that his fire will jump the gap between his trash
pile and his neighbor's corn fields. Despite this danger, Jake burns
his trash pile, hoping the fire will not jump to his neighbor's crop. It
turns out that the weather forecast was in error about the wind.
Jake's burning never creates any danger to his neighbor's field.
N

0

1

no liab. liab.
I day
but no
punish.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2 wks

2 mo

6mo

1 yr

3yr

7yr

15 yr

30 yr

life
death
imprisonment

11

6. Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and the local
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering
the people who live there. He can see the smoke from the
approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor's corn
crop he can create a firebreak that will stop the fire. (Remember that
Jake's own field is not located where it could serve as a firebreak.)
Jake knows that his neighbor is not available to ask for permission,
and he burns the fields. The fire destroys the entire crop. Because of
his quick work the town and its inhabitants are saved.
N

0

1

noliab. liab.
Iday
but no
punish.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2wks

2mo

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15yr

30yr

life
death
imprisonment

11

7. Jake is angry with his neighbor over a dispute about use of
water from a creek that the two share. When he knows that his
neighbor is away, he sets fire to the neighbor's three acres of corn.
Because the field is bounded on all sides by dirt roads, it is clear that
the burning will create no danger beyond that of destroying the
neighbor's corn. The fire destroys the entire crop. Unbeknown to
Jake, lightning has started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's
fields and the local town and the fire is burning toward the town and
endangering the people who live there. His burning the field creates
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a firebreak: The town and its inhabitants are saved.
N

0

noliab. flab.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Iday

2wks

2tmo

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15yr

30yr

life

death

imprisonment

but no
punish.

8. Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and the local
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering
the people who live there. He can see the smoke from the
approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor's corn
crop he can create a firebreak that will stop the fire. (Remember that
Jake's own field is not located where it could serve as a firebreak.)
Jake has no interest in saving the town; the townspeople have always
been unfriendly to him. Further, Jake is angry with his neighbor over
a dispute about use of water from a creek that the two share. He
decides to use the fire as an excuse to burn his neighbor's corn crop.
Without asking his neighbor for permission, he burns the fields. The
fire destroys the entire crop. Because of his quick work the town and
its inhabitants are saved.
N

0

1

I day
no liab. Hab.
but no
punish.

11

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2 wks

2 mo

6mo

1 yr

3yr

7yr

15 yr

30 yr

life
death
imprisonment

9. Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and the local
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering
the people who live there. In the past, Citizen's Band radio reports
have often been true, but also often false. Jake stops two cars that
are racing into town, and both confirm that "there is a big, out of
control fire, heading this way." (Any reasonable person would think
there was a destructive fire coming.) Jake can see the smoke from
the approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor's
corn crop he can create a firebreak that will stop the fire.
(Remember that Jake's own field is not located where it could serve
as a firebreak.) Jake knows that his neighbor is not available to ask
for permission, and he burns the fields. The fire destroys the entire
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crop. It turns out that the radio report was in error. The smoke was
from a controlled burn being done by a crew of local foresters and
presented no danger to the town or any of the surrounding area.
N

0

1

noliab. liab.
Iday
but no
punish.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2wks

2mo

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15yr

30yr

life
death
imprisonment

11

10. Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and the local
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering
the people who live there. In the past, Citizen's Band radio reports
have often been true, but also often false. Jake doesn't think of this,
and although a reasonable person would do so, Jake doesn't think to
check on the truth of the report, but there is no doubt in his mind
that it is a dangerous fire. Jake can see the smoke from the
approaching fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor's corn
crop he can create a firebreak that will stop the fire. (Remember that
Jake's own field is not located where it could serve as a firebreak.)
Jake knows that his neighbor is not available to ask for permission,
and he burns the fields. The fire destroys the entire crop. It turns out
that the radio report was in error. The smoke was from a controlled
burn being done by a crew of local foresters and presented no danger
to the town or any of the surrounding area.
N

0

1

noliab. liab.
Iday
but no
punish.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2wks

2too

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15yr

30yr

life
death
imprisonment

11

11. Jake hears over his Citizen's Band radio that lightning has
started a fire upwind from his and his neighbor's fields and the local
town and that the fire is burning toward the town and endangering
the people who live there. In the past, Citizen's Band radio reports
have often been true, but also often false. Jake remembers this fact,
and realizes there might not be a dangerous fire, but doesn't check on
the truth of the report. He can see the smoke from the approaching
fire and calculates that if he burns his neighbor's corn crop he can
create a firebreak that will stop the fire. (Remember that Jake's own
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field is not located where it could serve as a firebreak.) Jake knows
that his neighbor is not available to ask for permission, and he burns
the fields. The fire destroys the entire crop. It turns out that the
radio report was in error. The smoke was from a controlled burn
being done by a crew of local foresters and presented no danger to
the town or any of the surrounding area.
N

0

1

Iday
noliab. lab.
but no
punish.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2wks

2mo

6mo

lyr

3yr

7yr

15 yr

30 yr

life
imptisonment

